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ON THE HISTORICAL SCHOOL OF JURISPRUDENCE
ROBERT E. RODES, JR.
Among schools of jurisprudence, the Historical School is like a poor and
slightly eccentric relation. Everyone is polite to it, and no one explicitly
disowns it, but no one really takes it seriously. Some writers mention its
contribution to historical scholarship or its role in building up the intellectual
life of nineteenth century German universities. Others have found it a fore-
runner of sociological jurisprudence on the one hand and Nazism on the other.
Sir Carleton Kemp Allen, in his classical Law in the Making, says of Friedrich
Karl von Savigny (1779-1861), the founder of the school:
If Savigny was an evolutionist before the evolutionists, so he was a sociologist
before the sociologists. Without disrespect to their scholarly genius, it is difficult
not to feel that unconsciously (for they could hardly guess what would be built
on the foundations which they laid) Savigny and his followers were National
Socialists before the National Socialists.'
But what Savigny and his followers really were was a school of juris-
prudence-a way of looking at the enterprise of making and applying law. As
is the case with other schools, we can learn things about jurisprudence from
considering carefully what they have to say, even if we cannot follow them all
the way.
The basic tenet of the school is that law in its essence is not something
imposed on a community from above or from without, but is an inherent part
of its ongoing life, an emanation of the spirit of the people. Savigny, in the
little book that is taken as the foundation document of the school, puts the
matter this way:
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law will be found to
have already attained a fixed character, peculiar to the people, like their langu-
age, manners, and constitution. Nay, these phenomena have no separate exis-
tence, they are but the particular faculties and tendencies of an individual people,
inseparably united in nature, and only wearing the semblance of distinct attri-
butes to our view. That which binds them into one whole is the common
conviction of the people, the kindred consciousness of an inward necessity,
excluding all notion of an accidental and arbitrary origin.2
1. Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making, 6th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1958), 86.
2. Frederick Charles von Savigny, Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and
Jurisprudence, tr. Abraham Hayward (London, Littlewood, 1831; repr. Birminghom, Legal
Classics Library, 986), 24. The translation is from the 1828 German edition. The first edition
appeared in 1814.
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In later works, Savigny was to use the term Volksgeist, spirit of the people, to
designate what he regarded as the source of law.3 The German word is more
evocative than the translation, so commentators have tended to leave it in
place, and I shall do the same.
Savigny was aware of course that law, however it arose, could be subjected
to scholarly analysis-he himself produced a good deal-and to legislative
improvement. But scholars and legislators were not expected to create anew.
Their task was to organize and clarify something that already existed, to make
fuzzy distinctions sharp and vague boundaries precise. Occasionally, to be
sure, new situations or new moral insights call for entirely new legislative
enactments. But "[t]hat enactments of this kind easily become a baneful
corruption of the law, and that they should be most sparingly employed, must
strike anyone who consults history."4
When Savigny began his work, Germany was just beginning the process of
recovering from the trauma of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars
and achieving political unity. He was immediately successful in persuading
German legal scholars to abandon their precipitate embrace of the Code
Napoleon, and to explore the medieval and Roman roots of their own law. He
also provided one of the strands in the German romanticism that many, includ-
ing Allen, quoted above, see as providing a sentimental backdrop for Hitler
and his minions.
I am not persuaded, as Allen seems to be, that Savigny and his school made
a significant contribution to the later Sociological School of jurisprudence.
The two schools have in common that they rely more on empirical observation
and less on philosophical speculation than some of the more rationalistic
schools do. But there the common element ceases. One school adapts histori-
cal method to the law where the other adapts sociological method. There is
some overlap between the two, but not a lot. It is sometimes possible for a
historian to crunch numbers, and it is sometimes possible for a sociologist to
3. Friedrich Karl von Savigny, System des heutigen Rbmischen Rechts, vol. 1 (Berlin,
Viet, 1840), 14. It appears that the term was first used in law by Puchta in 1828. Georg Friedrich
Puchta, Das Gewohnheitsrecht, Erster Teil (Barmstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,
1965)(1828), 138. Before that, it had been used in philosophy by Hegel. G. W. F. Hegel,
Vorlesungen Uber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, ed. K.H. Ilting et al. (Berlin: Felix
Meiner Verlag, 1996) (1822-23), 318. For the earlier development of the concept, see Nathan
Rotenstreich, "Volksgeist," 4 Dictionary of the History of Ideas, 490 at 491-3 (New York:
Scribner, 1974).
4. Savigny, supra, note 2, 32.
5. Hermann Kantorowicz, "Savigny and the Historical School of Jurisprudence," 53 Law
Quarterly Review 326 (1937).
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make an empathetic leap where there are no numbers to crunch. More often,
though, the two disciplines go their separate methodological ways.
Sociological jurisprudence is also unique in the dominance within the
school of technological metaphors, led by Roscoe Pound's central metaphor
of "social engineering. ' 6 This school studies for the sake of control, and its
central problem is that history is subject to no such control as it proposes. The
Historical School proposes rather to make incremental improvements on the
basis of an understanding of the ongoing historical process of which we are
a part:
[T]he subserviency of the present to the past will manifest itself even when the
present is purposely opposed to the past. There is consequently no mode of
avoiding this overruling influence of the existing matter; it will be injurious to
us as long as we ignorantly submit to it; but beneficial if we oppose to it a vivid
creative energy-obtain the mastery over it by a thorough grounding in history,
and thus appropriate to ourselves the whole intellectual wealth of preceding
generations.7
Of course, the Volksgeist carries a mystique that is not reducible to learning
by experience. Through it law is traced back to a people's sense of its identity
and of its own particular ways of doing things. It is the extravagant sweep that
Savigny claims for this mystique that has brought forth the most telling criti-
cisms to which his Historical School has been subjected by practical-minded
English and American jurists. Here is how John Chipman Gray states the most
obvious objection:
By the law of Massachusetts, a contract by letter is not complete until the answer
of acceptance is received. By the law of New York, it is complete when the
answer is mailed. Is the common consciousness of the people of Massachusetts
different on this point from that of the people of New York?... In truth, not one
in a hundred of the people in either state has the slightest notion on the matter.8
Savigny meets this objection by claiming that judges and legal scholars work
out the technical details on behalf of the people.9 Gray points out that the
sophistication and eclecticism of legal scholars make this argument untenable:
6. Roscoe Pound, Social Control Through Law (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
Press, 1942), 64.
7. Savigny, supra, note 2,132-33.
8. John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (New York: MacMillan,
1927), 90-91.
9. Savigny, supra, note 3, 45 and translated in Gray, supra, note 8, 91.
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It might be very desirable that the conceptions of the Volksgeist should be those
of the most skillful of the community, but however desirable this might be, it is
not the case. The Volksgeist carries a piece of sulphur in its waistcoat pocket to
keep off rheumatism, and thinks that butchers cannot sit on juries.'°
Furthermore, a lot of twentieth century jurisprudence shows how some law
aims at actually changing public attitudes and what Karl Llewellyn calls "folk-
ways" by deploying incentives and disincentives.11 I believe that public
attitudes toward both race segregation and abortion have been changed in this
way during my own time.
Finally, it has been pointed out that in Egypt in 1883, Japan in 1898, and
Turkey in 1926, longstanding legal traditions were thrown overboard and
replaced by Civil Codes imported almost verbatim from Europe.12 There is no
indication that these foreign codes do not serve the ongoing life of the peoples
of these countries at least as well as the traditional legal systems that grew out
of their historical consciousness. In fact, they probably serve the ongoing lives
of their women a good deal better.
India also imported its legal system from the West. It appropriated the
English common law system, with suitable Indian material introduced not by
the people of India or their juristic surrogates, but by English lawyers, most
notably Macaulay. 13 M.C. Setalvad, the Attorney General of India, lecturing
on the subject at Lincoln's Inn in 1960, concludes:
For over a hundred years, distinguished jurists and judges in India have, basing
themselves upon theories of English common law and statutes, evolved doctrines
of their own suited to the peculiar need and environment of India. So has been
built up on the basis of the principles of English law the fabric of modem Indian
law which notwithstanding its foreign roots and origin is unmistakably Indian in
its outlook and operation.' 4
He quotes with approval a writing by Holdsworth analogizing the process to
the reception of Roman law in medieval Europe.' 5 That reception introduced
into Savigny's thought a paradox that many commentators have noticed. The
10. Gray, supra, note 8, 92.
11. Karl Llewellyn, "Law Observance Versus law Enforcement," 1928 Proceedings of the
Conference of Social Work 127 (1928).
12. F. P. Walter, "The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantations of Law,"
9 Journal of Comparative Law, 3d Series (1928) 183.
13. Thomas Babington Macaulay, "Government of India" in Speeches on Politics and
Literature 95, 121 (London: Everyman's Library, 1909). The speech was delivered in the House
of Commons on July 10, 1833.
14. M.C. Setalvad, The Common Law in India (London: Stevens, 1960), 225.
15. Ibid., 224-25.
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German Volksgeist seems to be pretty solidly grounded on Justinian's Insti-
tutes. 6 Setalvad's tracing of the development of common law in India may
suggest that Savigny is less paradoxical than he seems. The adoption of a new
legal system can be an authentic historical development like any other. It can
be part of the historical evolution of a people whether it comes from within or
from without, and whether it comes suddenly or gradually. If the Japanese, for
instance, are not less themselves for playing baseball and making cars, they
are probably not less themselves for copying parts of the German Civil Code.
It is possible to present the tenets of the Historical School in a straight-
forward practical form. Law is part of the culture of society. Different peoples
have different laws just as they have different styles of clothing and different
favorite foods. Legal enactments can nudge the culture in one direction or
another, but if the culture rejects them firmly enough they will fail of their
purpose: hence, for instance, the long hiatus between Brown v. Board of
Education and the final desegregation of Southern schools. 7 Economic and
social developments affect both what law is needed and what law is possible:
consider the effect of women's liberation on alimony. Historical experience
affects moral judgment and with it the willingness to accept this or that form
of legal restraint: German free speech doctrine is a good deal less tolerant of
racist talk than our own is.' 8
All this is true, but I do not think it reaches the real significance of the
Volksgeist. Savigny set up his doctrine as a challenge to two theories that were
commonly accepted in his day. They are still commonly accepted, and they
still need to be challenged. One is an understanding of law as command:
"According to this theory, all law in its concrete form, is founded upon the
express enactments of the supreme power. Jurisprudence has only the contents
of the enactments for its object."' 9 The other is a one-size-fits-all under-
standing of natural law: "The conviction that there is a practical law of nature
or reason, an ideal legislation for all times and all circumstances, which we
have only to discover to bring positive law to permanent perfection. '2 Against
both, the Historical School insists that the laws of a particular people emerge,
16. F.W. Maitland, "Translator's Introduction" in Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the
Middle Age, tr. F. W. Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900), xv-xvi.
17. Constance Baker Motley, "Twenty Years Later," The Continuing Challenge (Evanston,
Ill., Integrated Educ. Assoc., 1975) 11.
18. E. Stein, "History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the 'Auschwitz'
and other 'Lies"' 85 Michigan Law Review 277, 278 (1987): "The experience with the abuse
of freedoms that contributed to the demise of the Weimar Republic and the suppression of these
freedoms by the National Socialist regime left a deep imprint upon the Basic Law and
subsequent legislation."
19. Savigny, supra, note 2, 22-3.
20. Ibid., 23.
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and ought to emerge, from the unique historical experience of that people. It
emerges also, if we are to take the Volksgeist seriously, from unique spiritual
qualities of that people---qualities originally formed, no doubt, by their his-
torical experience, but freestanding at any given point of time.
As philosophy of history, these claims of the Historical School run counter
to the Enlightenment project of liberating individual creativity from the weight
of inherited restraint. As historiography, they reject the "Whig" interpretation
of history as a story of irresistible progress.2' As metaphysics, they bring into
question any generic view of the human condition or of human character. I
will consider the historical aspect first, and then turn to the metaphysical.
Among the famous aphorisms of Justice Holmes is one that "historic con-
tinuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity. '22 It was a necessity
of which Enlightenment thinkers were not much aware. Their enterprises were
continually attempting to do away with inherited institutions and values, and
build anew from scientific principles. In France, they started a new numbering
of years, they renamed all the months, and they decimalized the weeks.23 In
America, they argued that a majority of the voters could adopt a new con-
stitution whenever they pleased.24 In England, they developed philosophies of
government with mathematical precision and tried to get them enacted into
law.2 Not all of their efforts were successful, but during the period between
the French Revolution and the First World War, their ways of looking at the
world came to dominate Western thought.
Historical writing in the period reflected that dominance. It tended to
presuppose an ideal consummation in which Enlightenment values would pre-
vail everywhere, and to treat a given series of historical events as either
happily furthering or unhappily hindering the coming to pass of that consum-
mation. Herbert Butterfield characterized this tendency as "The Whig Inter-
pretation of History, '26 naming it after the party that British historians regard-
ed as attempting with some success to impose an Enlightenment agenda on
their country. There were a few dissenters from the approach, notably the
Marxists, but they too envisaged a consummation of history in terms of which
particular historical events could be evaluated.
21. Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: Bell, 1931).
22. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Learning and Science," Collected Legal Papers (New York:
Harcourt Brace, 1920), 138-39.
23. "Revolutionary Calendar," Encyclopedia Americana 23 (1986) 455. The metric system
was a more enduring result of the same impulse. See "Measures and Measuring Systems,"
Encyclopedia Americana 18 (1986) 584.
24. See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
25. Elie Haldvy, England in 1815, tr. Watkin and Barker (1961), 572-77.
26. Butterfield, supra, note 21.
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On the Enlightenment view, the subjection of law to history made it part
of the problem rather than part of the solution. The codifiers of the nineteenth
century tended to assign to law goals and values independent of history-what
I have called the one-size-fits-all version of natural law. Jurists of the first half
of the twentieth century tended rather to see law as taking control of history.
Roscoe Pound's use of technological metaphors such as "social engineering ' 27
was a notable example. Either approach is belied by Herbert Butterfield's
stern historiography, which insists that the effects of a particular intervention
in the historical process can be neither predicted nor controlled.28
Paradoxically, it is the recognition of the Volksgeist that emancipates law
from dependence on history. Enlightenment values, although they purport to
be historically neutral, are in fact the values of a particular time and place. As
long as we ignore their historical contingency, we will not be able to give
them whatever place they deserve in the development of our law. Now, at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, the difficulty seems particularly acute.
The historian Johannes Huizinga, in his book The Waning of the Middle Ages,
suggests that there is value in looking in history at the ends of periods:
History has always been far more engrossed by problems of origins than by those
of decline and fall.... But in history, as in nature, birth and death are equally
balanced. The decay of overripe forms of civilization is as suggestive a spectacle
as the growth of new ones. And it occasionally happens that a period in which
one had, hitherto, been mainly looking for the coming to birth of new things,
suddenly reveals itself as an epoch of fading and decay."
Huizinga's view, which he supports effectively by examples, is that when a
certain set of ideas and attitudes has dominated society long enough, it gets
run into the ground. All its potentialities are realized, and the attempt to
develop them further leads to absurdity and frustration, and finally to a settled
melancholy until new ideas and attitudes take over with new possibilities to
27. Pound, supra, note 6.
28. See Butterfield, supra, note 21, 19:
"It is nothing less than the whole of the past, with its complexity of movement, its
entanglement of issues, and its intricate interactions, which produced the whole of the
complex present; and this, which is itself an assumption and not a conclusion of historical
study, is the only safe piece of causation that a historian can put his hand upon, the only
thing which he can positively assert about the relationship between past and present.
When the need arises to sort and disentangle from the present one fact or feature that is
required to be traced back into history, the historian is faced with more unravelling than
a mind can do, and finds the network of interactions so intricate, that it is impossible to
point to any one thing in the sixteenth century as the cause of any one thing in the
twentieth."
29. J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954), 5.
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be realized and new challenges to be met. It is hard for a person reading the
United States Supreme Court Reports, opening any half dozen recent acade-
mic publications, or even watching television not to believe that this is what
has happened in our day to the ideas and attitudes of the Enlightenment.
Individual creativity, freed from inherited restraints, has gone from the
Declaration of Independence, the steam engine, the novel, and antibiotics to
Auschwitz, nuclear weapons, topless dancing, and crack cocaine.
The grassroots are not immune to the rise and fall of attitudes and ideas in
history, but they are less receptive to sudden radical change than either intel-
lectuals or power wielders are. Adherence to a Volksgeist, therefore, can curb
the enthusiasm of legislators for putting new ideas into practice simply
because they have the power to do so. Long before Savigny drew on the con-
cept to check the adoption of the Code Napoleon in Germany, English lawyers
were drawing on their ancient and idiosyncratic legal system to check the
absolute monarchy that was the first legal embodiment of Enlightenment
thought. As Roscoe Pound put it in The Spirit of the Common Law:
In the seventeenth century, it was progressive to insist upon the royal preroga-
tive. Those who thought of the king as the guardian of social interests and
wished to give him arbitrary power, that he might use it benevolently in the
general interest, were enraged to see the sovereign tied down by antiquated legal
bonds discovered by lawyers in such musty and dusty parchments as Magna
Carta.3°
Long after Savigny, by the same token, we find Mary Ann Glendon seeking
to "tap the reserves of wisdom, virtue, and imagination that Americans still
display in their varied communities of memory and mutual aid"'" for the
purpose of "refining the rhetoric of rights" in response to the hypertrophied
individualism that she finds dominating our national appropriation of
Enlightenment thought.32 It is easy to see her argument as an appeal to the
American Volksgeist to correct the excesses of academic absolutism that have
grown up in our law.
The tenets of the Historical School provide a useful rhetoric for anyone
who wants to set up a customary way of doing things against the powers of
arbitrary benevolence or mindless rationality. But it will not do to embrace a
doctrine for its rhetorical convenience if it is in fact not true. So we must turn
at this point to metaphysical and moral questions. Is there a Volksgeist? If so,
30. Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common Law (Boston: Marshall, Jones, 1921), 63.
31. Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk (New York: Free Press, 1991), xiii.
32. Ibid., 171-83.
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is there any particular value in conforming to it? And if there is such a value,
how does it relate to more universal values, such as human solidarity?
It is clear to me that the answer to the first question is yes. There is a
Volksgeist, which people come by through having a common history and a
common narrative account of it. It is to this that Martin Luther King appeals
when he claims support in "the sacred heritage of our nation,"33 and this is
what he has in mind when he claims to be part of "a movement designed to
save the soul of a nation."34 Its development is treated in a perceptive book,
Race Pride and the American Identity, by the sociologist Joseph Rhea. Rhea
shows how "a new American collective consciousness"35 has been produced
by a restatement of our history to do more justice to the minorities who were
on the losing end of our various historical struggles. This common conscious-
ness, the historical experience that gives rise to it, and the common ways of
doing things that go with it add up, I believe, to a metaphysical reality that can
properly be called a Volksgeist.
French schoolchildren are taught that to be a nation is to have done great
things together and to wish to do more.36 This is the positive aspect of a
common history. There may be a negative aspect also. People may have done
bad things together, or bad things to each other, and wish not to do any more
of them. In either case, we become situated in time and space by recognizing
a particular history as our own. My colleague Teresa Phelps has written of the
work of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in allowing the victims of
unspeakable oppression to tell their stories and thereby play their part in the
construction of a master narrative under which oppressors and oppressed can
live together.37 In the same way, Rhea, in the book just referred to, shows how
American minorities have claimed a place in the common life of our country
by giving its master narrative a new and less triumphalist form. The process
is the flip side of the construction of patriotic songs and folklore that goes into
the shared memory of a people. For good or ill, both sides of the process are
part of the moral and spiritual baggage of anyone who is born into the people
33. Martin Luther King, Letter from the Birmingham Jail (Philadelphia: American Friends
Service Committee, 1963), 13.
34. "Man of the Year," Time, January 3, 1964, 13, 27.
35. Joseph Tilden Rhea, Race Pride and the American Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1997), 7.
36. Bernard Lescot and Jean Sinou, Instruction Civique, 29th ed. (Paris: Editions Andr,
1983), 40. "La Nation, comme l'individu, est l'aboutissement d'un long pass6 d'efforts, de
sacrifices et de drvouements. Avoir fait de grandes choses ensemble, vouloir en faire encore,
voild a les conditions essentielles pour 6tre un peuple." Ibid. The authors attribute the quotation
to Renan.
37. Teresa Godwin Phelps, Shattered Voices (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2004).
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in question, or who wishes to join them. Recent immigrants into the United
States and their children have sometimes tried to disclaim responsibility for
slavery and its aftermath, pointing out that neither they nor their ancestors
were involved in it. But their disclaimer cannot be accepted. Anyone who
becomes an American becomes an inheritor of the American past.
The metaphysical recognition of a people goes with a similar recognition
of other continuing bodies. Alumni speak of a college spirit, students of cor-
poration law speak of a corporate culture. People attach spiritual qualities to
cities, and no one gainsays them. Here too, a newcomer to the corporate body
is expected to appropriate the corporate ethos and the corporate past as his
own. One of the most moving monuments I know is in the chapel of New
College, Oxford, surrounded by medieval, seventeenth century, Georgian, and
Victorian memorabilia of all kinds. It says:
In memory of the men of this college who coming from a foreign land entered
into the inheritance of this place & returning fought & died for their country in
the war 1914-1918
followed by three German names. Where there is a shared history, a shared
heritage, there is a metaphysical reality.
While New College, Oxford is a metaphysical reality distinct from, say, the
London School of Economics, both are part of the metaphysical reality of the
United Kingdom. Similarly, I believe that the United Kingdom, France, Brazil,
Zimbabwe, and all the other nations of the world are part of a metaphysical
reality of humankind. Just as there is a Volksgeist for a particular people
developed out of its particular history, so there is a worldwide Volksgeist, a
Volksgeist of the human race, developed out of the history of the world. For
this reason, the Historical School of jurisprudence, while it is inconsistent
with what I have called one-size-fits-all natural law, is not inconsistent with
natural law as such. Human nature sets limits to the legal styles of different
peoples just as the shape of the human body sets limits to their clothing styles.
For obvious reasons, a particular people would be no more apt to come up
with a law to permit driveby shootings than to come up with a fashion for
six-legged trousers or shoes without soles.
Writers in the natural law tradition have also seen legal institutions
common to every system of which they are aware, but not, in their opinion,
philosophically required by human nature. These they have included in what
they call jus gentium, the law of peoples.38 If we can attribute the laws of a
particular people to a particular Volksgeist, we should be able to attribute the
38. See Paul Vinogradoff, "Historical Types of International Law," Collected Papers of
Paul Vinogradoff, Vol. 2, ed. H. A. L. Fisher, 248 at 269-72 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1928);
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Pts. II, II, 57, 3.
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jus gentium to the Volksgeist of humanity. The most important of the institu-
tions traditionally attributed to thejus gentium is private property. In point of
philosophy or theology, all the resources of the world are common to all the
people of the world. But long historical experience has led to the conclusion
that some form of private property is required to distribute the common
resources for people to use.
39
The worldwide Volksgeist, and therefore the provisions of thejus gentium,
develop through time, whereas human nature, and therefore the requirements
of natural law, do not. Jacques Maritain, in his book On the Philosophy of
History describes what he calls a "law of the world significance of history
making events"4 ° and a "law of prise de conscience."'" According to the first,
when a major historical transition such as the French Revolution takes place
anywhere, its effects are felt worldwide. According to the second, people's
perception of right and wrong develops with historical experience. Putting the
two together, we can see documents like the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and principles like the criminal liability of rulers who violate those
rights gradually working their way into the jus gentium or what is called
"customary international law."42
Theologians have discerned a comparable development in the moral teach-
ing of the Catholic Church. Continuing reflection on the original deposit of
revelation, plus people's experience of trying to love their neighbors through
the continuing vicissitudes of history have continually led to new under-
standings of how Christians should live:
39. See Drostan Maclaren, Private Property and the Natural Law (Oxford: Blackfriars,
1942), 14-23.
40. Jacques Maritain, On the Philosophy of History (New York: Scribner, 1957), 62.
41. Ibid., 69. Maritain goes on to take up "the progress of the moral conscience" as a
related law. Ibid., 104-07.
42. Maritain, who played a major part in the development of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, saw it as a product of a practical consensus between those who accept and those
who reject natural law as the basis of human rights. For the second group, "man's rights are
relative to the historical development of society." "Introduction" in UNESCO, Human Rights:
Comments and Interpretations (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1949) 9, 13-4. At the same
time, the proponents of natural law could concede that "although certain fundamental rights
meet a prime necessity of that law, while others meet only a secondary necessity or are merely
desirable, nevertheless our knowledge of both is in all circumstances subject to slow and
irregular growth, so that those rights only stand forth as acknowledged rules of conduct as moral
consciousness progresses and societies evolve." Ibid. I think Maritain's analysis justifies me
in seeing the Declaration as entering into thejus gentium through a development of the world-
wide Volksgeist. On the status of the Declaration and the rights embodied in it as international
law, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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With the help of the Holy Spirit [the Volksgeist of the Church], it is the task of
the entire People of God, especially pastors and theologians, to hear and inter-
pret the many voices of our age, and to judge them in the light of the divine
Word. In this way, revealed truth can always be more deeply penetrated, better
understood, and set forth to greater advantage.43
This passage is from the Second Vatican Council's Gaudium et Spes. It is
immediately preceded by an exhortation to preach the Gospel to different
peoples in accordance with their different ways of thinking, "For thus each
nation develops the ability to express Christ's message in its own way.""
Even in the Church, the divine prerogative of direct intervention in the
process of historical development is only sparingly exercised. The Volksgeist
as we actually encounter it among the subjects of any given legal system is apt
to display a daunting mixture of good things and bad. In our own case, we
cannot deny the justice of the 1960s black activist's remark that "violence is
as American as cherry pie,"45 or of Kipling's evocation of the American Spirit
in such lines as "His hands are black with blood; his heart/ Leaps as a babe's
at little things. 46 We might note also that the most prominent of the legal
institutions that arose spontaneously among us in rather the manner Savigny
had in mind was slavery.47 The Volksgeist, taken by itself, cannot provide an
adequate criterion for distinguishing good laws from bad.
Well, then, what good is it? Suppose we accept that the Volksgeist exists,
and is, as Savigny claimed, a primary source of a people's law. The fact may
be of profound significance for history, for anthropology, even for philosophy.
But what does it mean for jurisprudence? I believe the place to look for an
answer is in the trends that Savigny sought to oppose in developing his
theory-the idea that law is nothing but an exercise of power by the person or
persons in authority, and the one-size-fits-all understanding of natural law.
Against these, the Historical School has insisted that if an exercise of power
is not to be either tyrannous or ineffective, it must take account of the history
43. Gaudium et Spes, no. 44 in The Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott, S.J.
(New York: American Press, 1966) 246.
44. Ibid.
45. H. Rap Brown, Oxford Dictionary of Modem Quotations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press), 41.
46. Rudyard Kipling, "An American," Rudyard Kipling's Verse: Inclusive Edition, 1885-
1918 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1926), 210.
47. I have not found in any of the literature any reference to an articulated decision that the
institution of slavery should exist in the British possessions in North America or the Caribbean.
It appears that the first blacks in the colonies were on the same level as indentured servants, but
that they were soon distinguished from whites by making their servitude perpetual. See, e.g.,
Paul Finkelman, The Law of Freedom and Bondage: A Casebook (New York: Oceana, 1986),
1-25.
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and predilections of the people it is to affect, and that one size does not fit all,
because historical experience affects the way human nature is instantiated in
a particular people.
Corollary to these doctrines, and most important in a revolutionary age, is
the principle that as far as possible law reform should be brought about by
repairing existing dispositions rather than by demolishing them and setting up
new ones. Edmund Burke makes this point eloquently in his Reflections on the
Revolution in France, a work that evidently influenced Savigny:
By a constitutional policy working after the pattern of Nature, we receive, we
hold, we transmit our government and our privileges in the same manner in
which we enjoy and transmit our property and our lives. The institutions of
policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of Providence, are handed down to us, and
from us, in the same course and order.... Thus, by preserving the method of
Nature in the conduct of the state, in what we improve we are never wholly new,
in what we retain we are never wholly obsolete.48
Note how effectively Burke appeals at once to a general Nature and a parti-
cular history. In contrast, he tells his French correspondent:
[Y]ou chose to act as if you had never been moulded into civil society, and had
everything to begin anew. You began ill, because you began by despising every-
thing that belonged to you. You set up your trade without a capital.... Respect-
ing your forefathers, you would have been taught to respect yourselves. You
would not have chosen to consider the French as a people of yesterday, as a
nation of low-born, servile wretches until the emancipating year of 1789.49
He argues that, while France had fallen lately into despotism, it had in its own
traditions sufficient material for the restoration of freedom: "You might have
repaired those walls; you might have built on those old foundations. 50
When we turn the doctrines we have been looking at into working juris-
prudence, we come up with four principles that can have considerable utility
in the task of making and applying law.
First, there is the principle that one size does notfit all. This principle is
somewhat against the American grain, so we have to work at applying it. One
example is in the making of constitutions. We have a custom of doing that by
convention and referendum.5 That is, when we want a new constitution
48. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. J.G.A. Pocock (Buffalo,
New York: Prometheus, 1987) (1790), 29-30.
49. Ibid., 31-32.
50. Ibid., 31.
51. Albert 1. Sturm, Methods of State Constitutional Reform (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University
of Michigan Press, 1954) 25-8. See also, "Constitutional Law," 16 C.J.S. § 8 (1984); and
"Constitutional Law," 16 Am. Jur. 2d § 23 (1998).
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-which, given our fifty states, we do fairly often-we elect a convention to
draft one. When they have drafted it, we submit it to a referendum of the
people it is to serve. If they adopt it by a majority vote, we happily put it in
force, and regard the government chosen under it as the only legitimate
government for the people in question. The process works every time. But
when we tried it in Vietnam in 1967, it did not work at all. We (or the
Vietnamese at our instigation) got up a convention, a referendum, and an
election just as we do at home,52 but it gave the leaders no more legitimacy in
the eyes of their people than they had had before. We have also made a few
gestures toward doing the same thing in Afghanistan. We unearthed from the
local traditions something that looked a little like a convention, laid hold of
it with all our might, and tried to elicit from it a government that the whole
country would accept.5 3 The returns are not all in yet, but they are not
promising. We have made somewhat similar moves in Iraq, with equally
dubious results. It is commendable to replace anarchy, terror, and corruption
with stable democratic government, but we cannot do it without looking
carefully at the history and culture-in a word, the Volksgeist-of the people
affected.
The debate over racial preferences-"affirmative action"--often involves
a choice between one-size-fits-all and a more historically nuanced approach.
It is possible to say that all distinctions based on race are inherently unaccept-
able, but if you say that, you will have to condemn the recognition by African
countries of different marriage and inheritance customs for different tribes, the
exemption of Indians from certain hunting and fishing regulations, and the
reservation of certain lands in Hawaii for descendants of the original inhabi-
tants54 right along with segregated schools for American blacks. The under-
lying principle of natural law is that all human beings are of equal worth. But
how the worth of a particular group of people is to be affirmed today depends
in great part on how it was denied some other day. To judge particular
principles of American law in this regard without considering the history of
race relations in our country is to come up with nonsense.
Sometimes requirements peculiar to a given legal system are imposed by
the evolved structure of the system itself. Thus, in Duncan v. Louisiana
52. Richard Nixon, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's - Building for Peace,"
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 7 (March 1, 1971) 305.
53. Human Rights Watch, "Q. and A. on Afghanistan's Loya Jirga Process,"
http://www.hrw.org, (last accessed September 14, 2004).
54. See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (striking down racial limitation on right to
vote for trustees of property held in trust for native Hawaiians). In my opinion, the case was
wrongly decided.
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(1968)," the United States Supreme Court held that an American criminal
proceeding could not be fair if the accused did not have the opportunity to be
tried before a jury. Not that any system to be fair must permit a jury trial, but
that ours must:
A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no juries is easy to
imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and protections which
would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and American
systems. Yet no American State has undertaken to construct such a system....
In every State, including Louisiana, the structure and style of the criminal
process-the supporting framework and the subsidiary procedures-are of the
sort that naturally complement jury trial, and have developed in connection with
and in reliance upon jury trial. 6
Louisiana evidently did not try to draw on the French and Spanish roots of its
legal system to justify the limitations it imposed on the right to a jury. In its
criminal proceedings, it had used the jury from the outset in the same way as
other states.57
The second principle of working jurisprudence that comes out of the
thinking of the Historical School is that it is better to repair than to build
anew. This is the gist of Burke's reproach to his correspondent in France. The
revolutionaries of 1789 have not been the only ones to disregard it. Most of
us come from time to time upon a convoluted situation in which the best thing
to do seems to be to throw out the baby with the bathwater and find a new
baby. But the solidly successful legal innovations have always been those
founded on a careful appropriation of experience. Our Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, for instance, make good use of experience both under the earlier
procedural codes and under the common law. Almost every rule can be traced
back to a common law predecessor, and explained in terms of what was wrong
with the earlier forms. This is equally true of other codifications such as the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Indeed, the
Code Napoleon itself owes its success more to its adherence to past practices
than to its departure from them.
5 8
Savigny's most cogent objection to codification was that it interferes with
the continuing appropriation of experience:
55. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
56. Ibid.,149-50n.
57. Edward Livingston, A System of Penal Law for the State of Louisiana (Philadelphia:
James Kay, 1833; repr. Birmingham, Ala.: Legal Classics Library, 1991), 10-14.
58. Savigny, supra, note 2, 74.
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For if... circumstances should be favourable to a revision of the law, nothing
would be more conducive to the end in view than the being extensively
connected with preceding intelligent times; but the code now stands between,
impeding and throwing difficulties in the way of this connection on all sides.5 9
I think the best codifications show that Savigny was too pessimistic here.6 ° I
have taught and studied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in terms of their
historical antecedents, and I find in the modem rules a most useful lens
through which to view the procedural wisdom of our ancestors. Take, for
instance, Rule 2, "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil
action."' This language, first adopted in the New York Code of Civil
Procedure of 1848,61 puts an end to centuries of frustration with cases thrown
out of court for being brought under the wrong form of action. Taken together
with the requirement that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' 62 it is generally
regarded as putting an end to the requirement imposed by some courts under
the 1848 Code and its progeny that every plaintiff adopt a particular theory of
recovery and plead accordingly. 63 At the same time, an Appendix of Forms
attached to the Rules makes it clear that a claim can be stated in terms of the
theory it invokes if such a statement will contribute to clarity. Experience of
trying to plead "the facts constituting the cause of action" under the 1848
Code and its progeny' led to this approach.
The point is that these rules embody a great deal of experience of how best
to state a claim. And they make that experience more accessible by eliminat-
ing the futile arguments and forensic disappointments that the old practice
attached to minor errors or miscalculations in the process. In the same way,
Rule 12(b)(6), providing for dismissing a complaint for "failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted," gives better access than the old
demurrer practice did to the basic insight of our system that legal questions
should be decided before the facts are tried.
59. Ibid., 40-41.
60. To be sure, what Savigny has in mind seems to be a codification of all the existing law,
not just a particular part of it. Ibid., 33. But his objection would seem to apply as much and as
little to the one case as to the other.
61. 1848 N.Y. Laws, c. 379, § 62.
62. Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 8(a)(2).
63. See Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (St. Paul, Minn.: West
Publishing Co., 1928), 47-51.
64. 1848 New York Laws, supra, note, 61, c. 379, § 119. See also, Clark, supra, note 63,
138-79.
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The Uniform Commercial Code also was built on a solid foundation of
experience.65 The common law, the various Uniform Acts adopted during the
first decades of the twentieth century, and current commercial practice were
all taken into account. The object of the drafters was to streamline various
procedures that had become unnecessarily cumbersome over time, to get rid
of certain unfortunate interpretations of the existing law, and to secure
uniformity among the different states.6 6 The goal of uniformity had a lot to do
with the adoption in 1896 of a Civil Code for Savigny's own Germany. It too
was built on existing foundations, and its proponents were not slow to point
out that it was more in accord with the German spirit than the Code Napoleon
would have been.67
In short, there are codes and codes. Savigny's strictures on the subject
suggest caution, but in many cases the roots of legal material in the Volksgeist
can be tapped better with a code than without. Either way, the old foundations
should be built upon as far as possible rather than replaced.
The third principle is that official enactment is not always necessary to
change the law. Law is meant to regulate the way people live together in
society, and changes in the way they live together will inevitably be reflected
in the law. The common law of England requires the owner of chickens to
fence them in so they will not eat up a neighbor's grain. In 1913, the Supreme
Court of Iowa refused to follow this rule:
The customs and habits of our people with reference to the care of poultry are
so well established and so thoroughly understood that we think all would be
shocked, to say the least, by a pronouncement from this court that they must
fence them in. 68
65. According to U.C.C. § 1-102, the purposes of the Code are "(a) to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions, (b) to permit the continued expansion
of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties [i.e., through
continuing reference to the Volksgeist] and (c) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." The intentions of the framers with regard to particular aspects of earlier law are
set forth in Comments attached to particular provisions of the Code. See especially the Official
Comment attached to § 9-101. Uniform LawsAnnotated 3A (West Group, 2002), 273. And note
that § 1-103 provides for using "the principles of law and equity including the law merchant"
to supplement the Code when needed. (Ibid.) In this way, the Code expressly avoids abolishing
its past in the manner envisaged by Savigny's objections.
66. Richard Danzig, "A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
Stanford Law Review 27 (1975) 621.
67. See Michael John, Politics and Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989) 244-45; and Maitland, supra, note 16, xvii.
68. Kimple v. Schafer, 1453 N.W. 505, 507 (Iowa 1913).
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But in 1977, when a motorist was injured trying to avoid a flock of geese in
the road, the same court held the owner of the geese liable, pointing to the
changes in road transport since 1913, and to the replacement of free ranging
chickens by chickens raised in giant buildings: "The established 'customs and
habits of our people with reference to the care of poultry' have largely gone
the way of the Model T Ford."69
In 1982, abandoning a long string of precedents, the Court of Appeals of
Indiana held that a married woman was liable for her own medical expenses:
"The anachronistic issue raised by this appeal is analogous to the current
status of the black bear in Indiana. ' 7' The court pointed out that the
non-liability of the wife dated back to a time when she did not have control of
her own property, and should not have survived the adoption of statutes giving
her such control. Changes in the customs and habits of our people regarding
the marriage relationship have also resulted in one place or another in making
a husband punishable for rape of his wife,7' abolishing the common law tort
of alienation of affections, 72 and requiring a wife to support her husband.
73
My fourth principle is the converse of the third. It is that legal enactments
do not necessarily change social practice. What I have in mind here is not the
obvious fact that some people disobey the law, but the equally true although
less obvious fact that there are some laws that almost everybody disobeys.
Laws are generally adopted to curb social deviance and to resolve disputes in
accordance with prevailing standards. When they set out to change prevailing
standards and make conduct deviant that was formerly the norm, they are
often frustrated. It is possible to make changes of this kind by the judicious
deployment of legal incentives and disincentives, but Savigny is quite right to
point out that no lawmaker can leave the current state of the Volksgeist out of
account. I recently saw a 60 Minutes program on dowries in India.74 It seems
that the families of grooms are demanding such extravagant dowries that
brides' families can fall into penury trying to meet the demand. The situation
is now so bad that large numbers of girl babies are being aborted, resulting in
such a gender imbalance that many men cannot find anyone to marry. The
69. Weber v. Madison, 251 N.W.2d 523, 529 (Iowa 1977).
70. Memorial Hospital v. Hahaj, 430 N.E.2d 413, 413 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
71. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 45 (N.J. 1981).
72. E.g., Wyman v. Wallace, 615 P.2d 452 (Wash. 1980).
73. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Family Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing
Co., 1995), 109. I have not found a case of a husband actually suing his wife for non-support,
but the duty of support is generally regarded as following from Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(state must give husband same right to alimony as wife) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
577 (1973) (husband of female military officer must be given same benefits as wife of male
officer).
74. CBS, 60 Minutes: For Love of Money (October 6, 2003).
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giving and receiving of dowry were prohibited by statute in 196l," but the
statute has not made much of a dent in the prevailing custom. Indeed, the
actual murder of brides who fail to come up with sufficient dowry goes all too
frequently unpunished. 76
The nearest we have come in our own country to systematic disregard of
the written law has been in the case of nationwide Prohibition and the case of
racial equality in the Southern States. In both cases, the written law butted
hard against entrenched folkways. In one, the folkways prevailed; in the other,
they eventually succumbed. The difference is instructive. Prohibition
incorporated a simplistic understanding of law as command. It resulted from
the temporary superiority at the ballot box of people who thought that drinking
was evil, and that they could make it go away by enacting laws against it. The
values it embodied never commanded a consensus in the country, and no
effort was made to bring one about. Threats and vilification were just about
the only things that the proponents of the law used to get people to obey it.
77
Civil rights legislation, by contrast, was adopted as part of a broad movement
to change people's attitudes. The success of the legislation was inseparable
from the success of the movement.78
What I call working jurisprudence has to provide answers to two questions:
Why do we have some laws and not others? And how can I tell good laws
from bad? These questions can be articulated in other ways, but one way or
another, they need to express the twofold function of the enterprise-
explanation and critique. Competing theories, therefore, are not like compet-
ing philosophical theories, which all aim at a unitary truth. So if one
philosopher says essence is prior to existence, and another says existence is
prior to essence, we know that at least one of them is wrong. But when
Holmes says law is a prediction of what judges will do in fact,79 and Hart says
law is a system of primary and secondary rules,8" they may both be right or at
least partly right. So when I propose a new look at the Historical School of
jurisprudence, I am not suggesting that it should displace any of the other
75. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (India, Act No. 28 of 1961).
76. U.S. State Department, Country Reports of Human Rights Practices for 2001,
(Washington, D.C.), 2439-40.
77. See William Gibbs McAdoo, The Challenge: Liquor and Lawlessness Versus
Constitutional Government (New York: Century Co., 1928).
78. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, "Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement,"
Virginia Law Review 80 (1994) 7, 137-38 (1994).
79. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review 10(1987), 457,
461.
80. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961) 92-95.
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schools on the market. What I am suggesting is that it provides explanations
and critiques in a number of cases where alternative schools fail to do so.
Take my 1977 Iowa case of the person who was injured trying to avoid a
flock of geese in a highway. If law is a system of primary and secondary rules,
one would have to say that the earlier chicken case created a primary rule in
Iowa that the owner of domestic fowl was not obliged to fence them in, and
that no secondary rule could account for a change. And if law is a prediction
of what the courts will do, one could not have predicted this case from
studying law books. But, as I believe I have shown, the kind of analysis
offered by the tenets of the Historical School makes it possible both to explain
the 1977 holding, and to approve it. One can then go further and make of the
explanation and approval a basis for predicting how cases will be decided in
the future, and a basis for discerning a rule of recognition that will apply to
certain new primary rules. In this way, we can develop a working harmony
among the theories that might be applied to the case.
In short, there is good reason to give the doctrines of the Historical School
a respected, although not an exclusive place, among the principles of juris-
prudence.
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